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Abstract
Coalition formation is a key topic in multiagent sys-
tems. One would prefer a coalition structure that max-
imizes the sum of the values of the coalitions, but often
the number of coalition structures is too large to allow
exhaustive search for the optimal one. But then, can
the coalition structure found via a partial search be
guaranteed to be within a bound from optimum?
We show that none of the previous coalition structure
generation algorithms can establish any bound because
they search fewer nodes than a threshold that we show
necessary for establishing a bound. We present an al-
gorithm that establishes a tight bound within this min-
imal amount of search, and show that any other algo-
rithm would have to search strictly more. The fraction
of nodes needed to be searched approaches zero as the
number of agents grows.
If additional time remains, our anytime algorithm
searches further, and establishes a progressively lower
tight bound. Surprisingly, just searching one more
node drops the bound in half. As desired, our algo-
rithm lowers the bound rapidly early on, and exhibits
diminishing returns to computation. It also drasti-
cally outperforms its obvious contenders. Finally, we
show how to distribute the desired search across self-
interested manipulative agents.
Introduction
Multiagent systems with self-interested agents are be-
coming increasingly important. One reason for this
is the technology push of a growing standardized com-
munication infrastructure—Internet, WWW, NII, EDI,
KQML, FIPA, Concordia, Voyager, Odyssey, Tele-
script, Java, etc—over which separately designed agents
belonging to different organizations can interact in an
open environment in real-time and safely carry out
transactions (Sandholm 1997). The second reason is
strong application pull for computer support for negoti-
ation at the operative decision making level. For exam-
ple, we are witnessing the advent of small transaction
commerce on the Internet for purchasing goods, infor-
mation, and communication bandwidth. There is also
an industrial trend toward virtual enterprises: dynamic
alliances of small, agile enterprises which together can
take advantage of economies of scale when available
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(e.g., respond to more diverse orders than individual
agents can), but do not suffer from diseconomies of
scale.
Multiagent technology facilitates the automated for-
mation of such dynamic coalitions at the operative deci-
sion making level. This automation can save labor time
of human negotiators, but in addition, other savings are
possible because computational agents can be more ef-
fective at finding beneficial short-term coalitions than
humans are in strategically and combinatorially com-
plex settings.
This paper discusses coalition structure generation in
settings where there are too many coalition structures
to enumerate and evaluate due to, for example, costly
or bounded computation and/or limited time. Instead,
agents have to select a subset of coalition structures on
which to focus their search. We study which subset
the agents should focus on so that they are guaranteed
to reach a coalition structure that has quality within a
bound from the quality of the optimal coalition struc-
ture.
Coalition formation setting
In many domains, self-interested real world parties—
e.g., companies or individual people—can save costs by
coordinating their activities with other parties. For ex-
ample, when the planning activities are automated, it
can be useful to automate the coordination activities as
well. This can be done via a negotiating software agent
representing each party. Coalition formation includes
three activities:
1. Coalition structure generation: formation of coali-
tions by the agents such that agents within each coali-
tion coordinate their activities, but agents do not co-
ordinate between coalitions. Precisely, this means
partitioning the set of agents into exhaustive and dis-
joint coalitions. This partition is called a coalition
structure (CS).
2. Solving the optimization problem of each coalition.
This means pooling the tasks and resources of the
agents in the coalition, and solving this joint prob-
lem. The coalition’s objective is to maximize mone-
tary value: money received from outside the system
for accomplishing tasks minus the cost of using re-
sources.
3. Dividing the value of the generated solution among
agents.
These activities interact. For example, the coalition
that an agent wants to join depends on the portion of
the value that the agent would be allocated in each
potential coalition.
This paper focuses on settings were the coalition
structure generation activity is resource-bounded: not
all coalition structures can be enumerated.
Our model of coalition structure
generation
Let A be the set of agents, and a = |A|. As is com-
mon practice (Kahan & Rapoport 1984; Shehory &
Kraus 1995; Shehory & Kraus 1996; Zlotkin & Rosen-
schein 1994; Ketchpel 1994; Sandholm & Lesser 1997),
we study coalition formation in characteristic function
games (CFGs). In such games, the value of each coali-
tion S is given by a characteristic function vS .
12 We as-
sume that vS is bounded from below for each coalition
S, i.e. no coalition’s value is infinitely negative. We
normalize the coalition values by subtracting at least
minS⊂A vS from all coalition values vS .
3 This rescales
the coalition values so that vS ≥ 0 for all coalitions
S. This rescaled game is strategically equivalent to the
original game.
A coalition structure CS is a partition of agents, A,
into coalitions. Each agent belongs to exactly one coali-
tion. Some agents may be alone in their coalitions. We
will call the set of all coalition structuresM . For exam-
ple, in a game with three agents, there are 7 possible
1These coalition values vS may represent the quality of
the optimal solution for each coalition’s optimization prob-
lem, or they may represent the best bounded-rational value
that a coalition can get given limited or costly computa-
tional resources for solving the problem (Sandholm & Lesser
1997).
2In other words, each coalition’s value is independent of
nonmembers’ actions. However, in general the value of a
coalition may depend on nonmembers’ actions due to pos-
itive and negative externalities (interactions of the agents’
solutions). Negative externalities between a coalition and
nonmembers are often caused by shared resources. Once
nonmembers are using the resource to a certain extent, not
enough of that resource is available to agents in the coalition
to carry out the planned solution at the minimum cost. Neg-
ative externalities can also be caused by conflicting goals. In
satisfying their goals, nonmembers may actually move the
world further from the coalition’s goal state(s) (Rosenschein
& Zlotkin 1994). Positive externalities are often caused by
partially overlapping goals. In satisfying their goals, non-
members may actually move the world closer to the coali-
tion’s goal state(s). From there the coalition can reach its
goals less expensively than it could have without the actions
of nonmembers. General settings with possible externalities
can be modeled as normal form games (NFGs). CFGs are
a strict subset of NFGs. However, many real-world mul-
tiagent problems happen to be CFGs (Sandholm & Lesser
1997).
3All of the claims of the paper are valid as long as vS ≥ 0
for the coalitions that the algorithm sees: coalitions not seen
during the search may be arbitrarily bad.
coalitions: {1}, {2}, {3}, {1,2}, {2,3}, {3,1}, {1,2,3}
and 5 possible coalition structures: {{1}, {2}, {3}},
{{1}, {2,3}}, {{2}, {1,3}}, {{3}, {1,2}}, {{1,2,3}}.
Usually the goal is to maximize the social welfare of
the agents A by finding a coalition structure
CS∗ = argmax
CS∈M
V (CS), (1)
where
V (CS) =
∑
S∈CS
vS (2)
The problem is that the number of coalition struc-
tures is large (Ω(aa/2)), so not all coalition structures
can be enumerated—unless the number of agents is ex-
tremely small (below 15 or so in practice).4 Instead,
we would like to search through a subset N ⊆ M of
coalition structures, pick the best coalition structure
we have seen
CS∗N = argmax
CS∈N
V (CS), (3)
and be guaranteed that this coalition structure is within
a bound from optimal, i.e. that
k ≥
V (CS∗)
V (CS∗N )
(4)
is finite, and as small as possible. We define nmin to be
the smallest size of N that allows us to establish such
a bound k.
A The set of agents.
a The number of agents, i.e. |A|.
S Symbol for a coalition.
CS Symbol for a coalition structure.
CS∗ Welfare maximizing coalition structure.
M The set of all possible coalition structures.
m |M |, total number of coalition structures.
N Coalition structures searched so far.
n |N |.
nmin Minimum n that guarantees a bound k.
CS∗N Welfare maximizing CS among ones seen.
V (CS) Value of coalition structure CS.
k Worst case bound on value, see Eq. 4.
Table 1: Important symbols used in this paper.
Lack of prior attention
Coalition structure generation has not previously re-
ceived much attention. Research has focused (Kahan &
Rapoport 1984; Zlotkin & Rosenschein 1994) on super-
additive games, i.e. games where vS∪T ≥ vS+vT for all
disjoint coalitions S, T ⊆ A. In such games, coalition
structure generation is trivial because the agents are
best off by forming the grand coalition where all agents
operate together. In other words, in such games, {A}
is a social welfare maximizing coalition structure.
4The exact number of coalition structures is∑
a
i=1
S(a, i), where S(a, i) = iS(a − 1, i) + S(a − 1, i − 1),
and S(a, a) = S(a, 1) = 1.
Superadditivity means that any pair of coalitions is
best off by merging into one. Classically it is argued
that almost all games are superadditive because, at
worst, the agents in a composite coalition can use solu-
tions that they had when they were in separate coali-
tions.
However, many games are not superadditive because
there is some cost to the coalition formation process it-
self. For example, there might be coordination overhead
like communication costs, or possible anti-trust penal-
ties. Similarly, solving the optimization problem of a
composite coalition may be more complex than solv-
ing the optimization problems of component coalitions.
Therefore, under costly computation, component coali-
tions may be better off by not forming the composite
coalition (Sandholm & Lesser 1997). Also, if time is
limited, the agents may not have time to carry out the
communications and computations required to coordi-
nate effectively within a composite coalition, so compo-
nent coalitions may be more advantageous.
In games that are not superadditive, some coalitions
are best off merging while others are not. In such cases,
the social welfare maximizing coalition structure varies.
This paper focuses on games that are not superadditive
(or if they are, this is not known in advance). In such
settings, coalition structure generation is highly non-
trivial.
Search graph for coalition structure
generation
Taking an outsider’s view, the coalition structure gen-
eration process can be viewed as search in a coalition
structure graph, Figure 1. Now, how should such a
graph be searched if there are too many nodes to search
it completely?
{1,2,3,4}
{1}{2}{3}{4}
{1},{2,3,4} {1,2},{3,4} {2},{1,3,4} {1,3},{2,4} {3},{1,2,4} {1,4},{2,3} {4},{1,2,3}
{1},{2},{3,4} {3},{4},{1,2} {1},{3},{2,4} {2},{4},{1,3} {1},{4},{2,3} {2},{3},{1,4}
(4)
Level
(3)
(2)
(1)
Figure 1: Coalition structure graph for a 4-agent game.
The nodes represent coalition structures. The arcs rep-
resent mergers of two coalition when followed down-
ward, and splits of a coalition into two coalitions when
followed upward.
Minimal search to establish a bound
This section discusses how a bound k can be established
while searching as little of the graph as possible.
Theorem 1 To bound k, it suffices to search the lowest
two levels of the coalition structure graph (Figure 1).
With this search, the bound k = a, and the number of
nodes searched is n = 2a−1.
Proof. To establish a bound, vS of each coalition S
has to be observed (in some coalition structure). The a-
agent coalition can be observed by visiting the bottom
node. The second lowest level has coalition structures
where exactly one subset of agents has split away from
the grand coalition. Therefore, we see all subsets at
this level (except the grand coalition). It follows that a
search of the lowest two levels sees all coalitions.
In general, CS∗ can include at most a coalitions.
Therefore,
V (CS∗) ≤ amax
S
vS ≤ a max
CS∈N
V (CS) = aV (CS∗N ).
Now we can set k = a ≥ V (CS
∗)
V (CS∗
N
) .
The number of coalition structures on the lowest level
is 1. The number of coalitions on the second lowest
level is 2a − 2 (all subsets of A, except the empty set
and the grand coalition). There are two coalitions per
coalition structure on this level, so there are 2
a−2
2 coali-
tion structures at the second to lowest level. So, there
are 1+ 2
a−2
2 = 2
a−1 coalition structures (nodes) on the
lowest two levels. ✷
Theorem 2 For the algorithm that searches the two
lowest levels of the graph, the bound k = a is tight.
Proof. We construct a worst case via which the bound
is shown to be tight. Choose vS = 1 for all coalitions S
of size 1, and vS = 0 for the other coalitions. Now,
CS∗ = {{1}, {2}, ..., {a}}, and V (CS∗) = a. Then
CS∗N = {{1}, {2, ..., a}}.
5 Because V (CS∗N ) = 1,
V (CS∗)
V (CS∗
N
) =
a
1 = a. ✷
Theorem 3 No other search algorithm (than the one
that searches the bottom two levels) can establish a
bound k while searching only n = 2a−1 nodes or fewer.
Proof. In order to establish a bound k, vS of each
coalition S must be observed. The node on the bot-
tom level of the graph must be observed since it is the
only node where the grand coalition appears. Assume
that the algorithm omits m nodes on the second level.
Each of the omitted nodes has CS = {P,Q}. Since
coalitions P and Q are never again in the same coali-
tion structure, two extra nodes in the graph have to
be visited to observe vP and vQ. Assume m coalition
structures {P1, Q1}, {P2, Q2}, . . . , {Pm, Qm} are omit-
ted. Since for i, j, i 6= j, at least one of the following is
true, Pi ∩ Pj 6= ∅, Pi ∩Qj 6= ∅, or Qi ∩Qj 6= ∅, at least
m+1 coalition structures must be visited to replace the
5This is not unique because all coalition structures where
one agent has split off from the grand coalition have the
same value.
m coalition structure omitted. Therefore, for the algo-
rithm to establish k, it must search n > 2a−1 nodes. ✷
So, nmin = 2
a−1, and this is uniquely established via
a search algorithm that visits the lowest two levels of
the graph (order of these visits does not matter).
Positive interpretation
Interpreted positively, our results (Theorem 1) show
that—somewhat unintuitively—a worst case bound
from optimum can be guaranteed without seeing all
CSs. Moreover, as the number of agents grows, the
fraction of coalition structures needed to be searched
approaches zero, i.e. nminm → 0 as a → ∞. This is
because the algorithm needs to see only 2a−1 coalition
structures while the total number of coalition structures
is Ω(aa/2). See Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Number of coalition structures, coalitions, and
coalition structures needed to be searched. We use a
logarithmic scale on the value axis; otherwise nmin and
the number of coalitions would be so small compared
to the number of coalition structures that their curves
would be indistinguishable from the category axis.
Interpretation as an impossibility result
Interpreted negatively, our results (Theorem 3) show
that exponentially many (2a−1) coalition structures
have to be searched before a bound can be estab-
lished. This may be prohibitively complex if the num-
ber of agents is large—albeit significantly better than
attempting to enumerate all coalition structures.
Viewed as a general impossibility result, Theorem 3
states that no algorithm for coalition structure gen-
eration can establish a bound in general characteris-
tic function games without trying at least 2a−1 coali-
tion structures. This sheds light on earlier algorithms.
Specifically, all prior coalition structure generation al-
gorithms for general characteristic function games (She-
hory & Kraus 1996; Ketchpel 1994)—which we know
of—fail to establish such a bound. In other words, the
coalition structure that they find may be arbitrarily far
from optimal.
Lowering the bound with further search
We have devised the following algorithm that will es-
tablish a bound in the minimal amount of search, and
then rapidly reduce the bound further if there is time
for more search.6
Algorithm 1
COALITION-STRUCTURE-SEARCH-1
1. Search the bottom two levels of the coalition struc-
ture graph.
2. Continue with a breadth-first search from the top of
the graph as long as there is time left, or until the
entire graph has been searched (this occurs when this
breadth-first search completes level 3 of the graph,
i.e. depth a− 3).
3. Return the coalition structure that has the highest
welfare among those seen so far.
In the rest of this section, we analyze how this algo-
rithm reduces the worst case bound, k, as more of the
graph is searched. The analysis is tricky because the
elusive worst case (CS∗) moves around in the graph
for different searches, N . We introduce the notation
h = ⌊a−l2 ⌋+ 2, which is used throughout this section.
Lemma 1 Assume that Algorithm 1 has just completed
searching level l. Then
1. If a ≡ l (mod 2) coalitions of size h will have been
seen paired together with all coalitions of size h − 2
or smaller.
2. If a 6≡ l (mod 2) coalitions of size h will have been
seen paired together with all coalitions of size h − 1
and smaller.
Proof.
1. At level l the largest coalition in any coalition struc-
ture has size a − l + 1. Therefore, one of the coali-
tion structures at level l is of the form S1, S2, . . . , Sl
where |Si| = 1 for i < l and |Sl| = a − l + 1. Since
a ≡ l (mod 2), h = a−l2 +2. Take coalition Sl and re-
move h agents from it. Call the new coalition formed
by the h agents S′l . We will distribute the remaining
a−l
2 − 1 agents among the coalitions of size 1. By
doing this we can enumerate all possible coalitions
that can appear pairwise with coalition S′l on level
l. For all j = 1, 2, . . . , a−l2 − 1, place
a−1
2 − j agents
in coalition S1 and call the new coalition S
j
1 . Redis-
tribute the remaining j − 1 agents among coalitions
S2, . . . , Sl−1. For each j we have listed a coalition
structure containing both S′l and S
j
1 . The largest of
these Sj1 has size
a−l
2 , or h− 2.
6If the domain happens to be superadditive, the algo-
rithm finds the optimal coalition structure immediately.
2. Since a 6≡ l (mod 2), h = a−1−l2 +2. Follow the same
procedure as for the case 1 except that this time there
are a−1−l2 remaining agents to be redistributed once
S′l has been formed. Therefore, when we redistribute
all these agents among the coalitions S1, . . . Sl−1, we
get all coalitions that were found in part 1, along with
coalitions of size h− 1. ✷
From Lemma 1, it follows that after searching level l
with Algorithm 1, we cannot have seen two coalitions
of h members together in the same coalition structure.
Theorem 4 After searching level l with Algorithm 1,
the bound k(n) is ⌈ ah⌉ if a ≡ h − 1 (mod h) and a ≡
l (mod 2). Otherwise the bound is ⌊ ah⌋.
Proof. Case 1. Assume a ≡ l (mod 2) and a ≡ h −
1(mod h−1). Let α be an assignment of coalition values
which give the worst case. For any other assignment
of coalition values, β, the inequality k(n) = Vα(CS
∗)
Vα(CSl)
≥
Vβ(CS
∗)
Vβ(CSl)
holds. Since CS∗ is the best coalition structure
under α, we can assume that VS = 0 for all coalitions
S 6∈ CS∗ without decreasing the ratio Vα(CS
∗)
Vα(CSl)
. Also,
no two coalitions S, S′ ∈ CS∗ can appear together if
vS + vS′ > max{vS“} for S
“ ∈ CS∗, since otherwise
we could decrease the ratio k(n). Therefore Vα(CSl) =
max{vS} for S ∈ CS∗ Call this value v∗. We can derive
an equivalent worst case, α′, from α as follows:
1. Find a coalition structure CS′ with ⌊ ah⌋ coalitions of
size h and one coalition of size h− 1.
2. Define v = Vα(CS
∗)
⌊ a
h
⌋+1 .
3. Assign a value v′S = v to each coalition in CS
′.
Clearly Vα(CS
∗) = Vα′(CS
′). From Lemma 1 we know
that no two coalitions in CS′ have been seen together.
The best value of a coalition structure seen during the
search is Vα′(CSl) = v. Therefore the following inequal-
ities hold;
Vα′(CS
′) = (⌊
a
h
⌋+ 1)v = (⌊
a
h
⌋+ 1)Vα′(CSl)
(⌊
a
h
⌋+ 1)Vα′(CSl) ≤ (⌊
a
h
⌋+ 1)v∗ ≤ (⌊
a
h
⌋+ 1)Vα(CSl).
Since Vα(CS
∗) = Vα′(CS
′) and Vα′(CSl) ≤ Vα(CSl),
k(n) =
Vα(CS
∗)
Vα(CSl)
≤
Vα′(CS
′
)
Vα′(CSl)
= ⌊
a
h
⌋+ 1 = ⌈
a
h
⌉.
Therefore the bound is ⌈ ah⌉.
Case 2. This is a similar argument as in Case 1, ex-
cept that the assignment of values to the coalitions in
the equivalent worst case coalition structure is different.
Define α as before and let CS+ be a coalition structure
with ⌊ ah⌋ coalitions of size h and one possible remainder
coalition of size less than h. Define v = Vα(CS
∗)
⌊ a
h
⌋ and as-
sign value v+S = v if |S| = h and S ∈ CS
+, otherwise let
vS = 0 for all other coalitions including the remainder
coalition in CS+. Thus the best coalition seen has value
Vα+(CSl) = vS and we have the following inequalities:
Vα+(CS
+) = (⌊
a
h
⌋)v = (⌊
a
h
⌋)Vα+(CSl)
(⌊
a
h
⌋)Vα+(CSl) ≤ (⌊
a
h
⌋)v∗ ≤ (⌊
a
h
⌋)Vα(CSl).
Therefore the bound k(n) = ⌊ ah⌋. ✷
Theorem 5 The bound in Theorem 4 is tight.
Proof. Case 1: Assume a ≡ l (mod 2) and a ≡
h − 1 (mod h). The bound is ⌈ ah⌉. Assume you have
the coalition structure CS′ from Theorem 4. Assign
value 1 to each coalition S ∈ CS′ and assign value 0
to all other coalitions. Then V (CS′) = ⌈ ah⌉. Since (
Lemma 1) no two of the coalitions in CS′ have ever
appeared in the same coalition structure, V (CSl) = 1.
Therefore V (CS
′)
V (CSl)
=
⌈ a
h
⌉
1 = ⌈
a
h⌉ and the bound is tight.
Case 2: Assume a 6≡ l(mod 2) or a 6≡ h−1(mod h). The
bound is ⌊ ah⌋. Assign value 1 to each coalition S ∈ CS
+
from Theorem 4 and assign value 0 to all other coali-
tions. Then V (CS+) = ⌈ ah⌉ and V (CSl) = 1. There-
fore V (CS
+)
V (CSl)
=
⌊ a
h
⌋
1 = ⌊
a
h⌋ and the bound is tight. ✷
As we have shown in the previous section, before 2a−1
nodes have been searched, no bound can be established,
and at n = 2a−1 the bound k = a. The surprising
fact is that by seeing just one additional node (n =
2a−1+1), i.e. the top node, the bound drops in half (k =
a
2 ). Then, to drop k to about
a
3 , two more levels need
to be searched. Roughly speaking, the divisor in the
bound increases by one every time two more levels are
searched. So, the anytime phase (step 2) of Algorithm 1
has the desirable feature that the bound drops rapidly
early on, and there are overall diminishing returns to
further search, Figure 3.
0 50000 100000
Number of nodes searched
1
3
5
7
9
k
COALITION−STRUCTURE−SEARCH−1
Splitting algorithm
Figure 3: Ratio bound k as a function of search size in
a 10-agent game.
Comparison to other algorithms
All previous coalition structure generation algorithms
for general CFGs (Shehory & Kraus 1996; Ketchpel
1994)—that we know of—fail to establish any worst
case bound because they search fewer than 2a−1 coali-
tion structures. Therefore, we compare our Algorithm 1
to two other obvious candidates:
• Merging algorithm, i.e. breadth first search from
the top of the coalition structure graph. This al-
gorithm cannot establish any bound before it has
searched the entire graph. This is because, to es-
tablish a bound, the algorithm needs to see every
coalition, and the grand coalition only occurs in the
bottom node. Visiting the grand coalition as a spe-
cial case would not help much since at least part of
level 2 needs to be searched as well: coalitions of size
a− 2 only occur there.
• Splitting algorithm, i.e. breadth first search from
the bottom of the graph. This is identical to Al-
gorithm 1 up to the point where 2a−1 nodes have
been searched, and a bound k = a has been estab-
lished. After that, the splitting algorithm reduces
the bound much slower than Algorithm 1. This can
be shown by constructing bad cases for the split-
ting algorithm: the worst case may be even worse.
To construct a bad case, set vS = 1 if |S| = 1,
and vS = 0 otherwise. Now, CS
∗ = {{1}, ..., {a}},
V (CS∗) = a, and V (CS∗N ) = l−1, where l is the level
that the algorithm has completed (because the num-
ber of unit coalitions in a CS never exceeds l−1). So,
V (CS∗)
V (CS∗
N
) =
a
l−1 ,
7 Figure 3. In other words the divisor
drops by one every time a level is searched. How-
ever, the levels that this algorithm searches first have
many more nodes than the levels that Algorithm 1
searches first.
Variants of the problem
In general, one would want to construct an anytime al-
gorithm that establishes a lower k for any amount of
search n, compared to any other anytime algorithm.
However, such an algorithm might not exist. It is con-
ceivable that the search which establishes the minimal
k while searching n′ nodes (n′ > n) does not include
all nodes of the search which establishes the minimal k
while searching n nodes. This hypothesis is supported
by the fact that the curves in Figure 3 cross in the end.
However, this is not conclusive because Algorithm 1
might not be the optimal anytime algorithm, and be-
cause the bad cases for the splitting algorithm were not
shown to be worst cases.
If it turns out that no anytime algorithm is best for all
n, one could use information (e.g. exact, probabilistic,
or bounds) about the termination time to construct a
design-to-time algorithm which establishes the lowest
possible k for the specified amount of search.
In this paper we have discussed algorithms that have
an off-line search control policy, i.e. the nodes to be
7The only exception comes when the algorithm completes
the last (top) level, i.e l = a. Then V (CS
∗)
V (CS∗
N
)
= 1.
searched have to be selected without using information
accrued from the search so far. With on-line search
control, one could perhaps establish a lower k with less
search because the search can be redirected based on the
values observed in the nodes so far. With on-line search
control, it might make a difference whether the search
observes only values of coalition structures, V (CS), or
values of individual coalitions, vS , in those structures.
The latter gives more information.
None of these variants (anytime vs. design-to-time,
and off-line vs. on-line search control) would affect our
results that searching the bottom two levels of the coali-
tion structure graph is the unique minimal way to es-
tablish a worst case bound, and that the bound is tight.
However, the results on searching further might vary in
these different settings. This is a focus of our future
research.
Distributing coalition structure search
among insincere agents
This section discusses the distribution of coalition struc-
ture search across agents (because the search can be
done more efficiently in parallel, and the agents will
share the burden of computation) and the methods of
motivating self-interested agents to actually follow the
desired search method. Self-interested agents prefer
greater personal payoffs, so they will search for coalition
structures that maximize personal payoffs, ignoring k.
In order to motivate such agents to follow a particular
search that leads to desirable social outcomes (e.g. a
search that guarantees a desirable worst case bound k),
the interaction protocol has to be carefully designed. It
is also necessary to take into account that an agent’s
preference between CSs depends on the way in which
V (CS) is distributed among the agents. Classical game
theoretic CS selection and payoff division methods are
not viable (unless modified) in our setting since they
require knowledge of every CS ∈ M . This is because,
according to those solution concepts, an agent can jus-
tifiably claim more than others receive from V (CS) by
objecting to CS (both to the structure and to the pay-
off distribution). A justified objection (as defined clas-
sically e.g. in (Kahan & Rapoport 1984)) depends on
all possible CSs. Thus it uses information beyond the
region of the search space that any nonexhaustive al-
gorithm should search. The protocol designer cannot
prohibit access to information that may support such
objection because the agents can locally decide what to
search. However, the protocol designer can forbid ob-
jections and make additional search unbeneficial, as we
demonstrate below.8 The distributed search consists of
the following stages:
8The protocol designer cannot prevent agents from opt-
ing out, but such agents receive null excess payoffs since
they do not collude with anyone. That is, for |S| = 1, the
payoff to the agent is equal to its coalition value vS . This
assumes that agents do not recollude outside the protocol,
but such considerations are outside of protocol design.
1. Deciding what part of the coalition structure
graph to search: This decision can be made in
advance (outside the distributed search mechanism),
or be dictated by a central authority, or by a ran-
domly chosen agent9, or be decided using some form
of negotiation. The earlier results in this paper give
prescriptions about which part to search. For exam-
ple, the agents can decide to use Algorithm 1.
2. Partitioning the search space among agents:
Each agent is assigned some part of the coalition
structure graph to search. The enforcement mech-
anism, presented later, will motivate the agents to
search exactly what they are assigned, no matter how
unfairly the assignment is done. One way of achiev-
ing ex ante fairness is to randomly allocate the set
search space portions to the agents. In this way, each
agent searches equally on an expected value basis, al-
though ex post, some may search more than others.9
The fairest option is to distribute the space so that
each agent gets an equal share.
3. Actual search: Each agent searches part of the
search space. The enforcement mechanism guaran-
tees that each agent is motivated to search exactly
the part of the space that was assigned to that agent.
Each agent, having completed the search, tells the
others which CS maximized V (CS) in its search
space.
4. Enforcement of the protocol: One agent, i, and
one search space of an agent j, j 6= i, will be selected
randomly.9 Agent i will re-search the search space
of j to verify that j has performed its search as re-
quired. Agent j gets caught of mis-searching (or mis-
representing) if i finds a better CS in j’s space than
j reported (or i sees that the CS that j reported does
not belong to j’s space at all). If j gets caught, it has
to pay a penalty P . To motivate i to conduct this ad-
ditional search, we make i the claimant of P . There
is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this proto-
col.10 If i searches and the penalty is high enough,
then j is motivated to search sincerely. However, i
is not motivated to search since it cannot receive P .
Instead, there will be a mixed strategy equilibrium
where i and j search truthfully with some probabili-
ties. By increasing P , the probability that j searches
can be made arbitrarily close to one. The probabil-
ity that i searches approaches zero, which minimizes
enforcement overhead.11
9The randomization can be done without a trusted third
party by using a distributed nonmanipulable protocol for
randomly permuting agents (Zlotkin & Rosenschein 1994).
Distributed randomization is also discussed in (Linial 1992).
10See (Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green 1995) for a defini-
tion of Nash equilibrium.
11Agent j will try to trade off the cost of search against
the risk of getting caught, and could decide that the risk is
worth taking. This problem can be minimized by choosing
a high enough P .
5. Additional search: The previous steps of this dis-
tributed mechanism can be repeated if more time to
search remains. For example, the agents could first
do step 1 of Algorithm 1. Then, they could repeat-
edly search more and more as time allows, again using
the distributed method.
6. Payoff division: Many alternative methods for
payoff division among agents could be used here.
The only concern is that the division of V (CS) may
affect what CS an agent wants to report as a re-
sult of its search since different CSs may give the
agent different payoffs (depending on the payoff di-
vision scheme). However, by making P high enough
compared to V (CS)s, this consideration can be made
negligible compared to the risk of getting caught.
Related research on computational
coalition formation
Coalition formation has been widely studied in game
theory (Kahan & Rapoport 1984; Bernheim, Peleg, &
Whinston 1987; Aumann 1959). They address the ques-
tion of how to divide V (CS∗) among agents so as to
achieve stability of the payoff configuration. Some also
address coalition structure generation. However, most
of that work has not taken into account the computa-
tional limitations involved. This section reviews some
of the work that has.
(Deb, Weber, & Winter 1996) bound the maximal
number of payoff configurations that must be searched
to guarantee stability. Unlike our work, they neither
address a bound on solution quality nor provide meth-
ods for coalition structure generation.
(Ketchpel 1994) presents a coalition formation
method which addresses coalition structure generation
as well as payoff distribution. These are handled simul-
taneously. His algorithm uses cubic time in the number
of agents, but guarantees neither a bound from opti-
mum nor stability of the coalition structure. There is
no mechanism for motivating self-interested agents to
follow his algorithm.
(Shehory & Kraus 1996) analyze coalition formation
among self-interested agents with perfect information in
CFGs. Their protocol guarantees that if agents follow
it (nothing necessarily motivates them to do so), a cer-
tain stability criterion (K-stability) is met. Their other
protocol guarantees a weaker form of stability (polyno-
mial K-stability), but only requires searching a polyno-
mial number of coalition structures. Their algorithm is
an anytime algorithm, but does not guarantee a bound
from optimum.
(Shehory & Kraus 1995) also present an algorithm
for coalition structure generation among cooperative
agents. The complexity of the problem is reduced by
limiting the number of agents per coalition. The greedy
algorithm guarantees that the solution is within a loose
ratio bound from the best solution that is possible given
the limit on the number of agents. However, this bench-
mark can, itself, be arbitrarily far from optimum. On
the other hand, our work computes the bound based on
the actual optimum. Our result that no algorithm can
establish a bound while searching less than 2a−1 nodes
does not apply to their setting because they are not
solving general CFGs. Instead, they address a more
specialized setting where the vS values have special
structure. In such settings it may be possible to estab-
lish a worst case bound with less search than in general
CFGs.
(Sandholm & Lesser 1997) study coalition forma-
tion with a focus on the optimization activity: how do
computational limitations affect which coalition struc-
ture should form, and whether that structure is sta-
ble? That work used a normative model of bounded ra-
tionality based on the agents’ algorithms’ performance
profiles and the unit cost of computation. All coali-
tion structures were enumerated because the number
of agents was relatively small, but it was not assumed
that they could be evaluated exactly because the opti-
mization problems could not be solved exactly due to
intractability. The methods of this paper can be com-
bined with their work if the performance profiles are
deterministic. In such cases, the vS values represent
the value of each coalition, given that that coalition
would strike the optimal tradeoff between quality of
the optimization solution and the cost of that computa-
tion. Our algorithm can be used to search for a coalition
structure, and only afterwards would the coalitions in
the chosen coalition structure actually attack their opti-
mization problems. If the performance profiles include
uncertainty, this separation of coalition structure gen-
eration and optimization does not work e.g. because
an agent may want to redecide its membership if its
original coalition receives a worse optimization solution
than expected.
Conclusions and future research
Coalition formation is a key topic in multiagent sys-
tems. One would prefer a coalition structure that max-
imizes the sum of the values of the coalitions, but often
the number of coalition structures is too large to allow
exhaustive search for the optimal one. This paper fo-
cused on establishing a worst case bound on the quality
of the coalition structure while only searching a small
portion of the coalition structures.
We showed that none of the prior coalition struc-
ture generation algorithms for general CFGs can estab-
lish any bound because they search fewer nodes than
a threshold that we showed necessary for establishing
a bound. We presented an algorithm that establishes
a tight bound within this minimal amount of search,
and showed that any other algorithm would have to
search strictly more. The fraction of nodes needed to
be searched approaches zero as the number of agents
grows.
If additional time remains, our anytime algorithm
searches further, and establishes a progressively lower
tight bound. Surprisingly, just searching one more node
drops the bound in half. As desired, our algorithm low-
ers the bound rapidly early on, and exhibits diminish-
ing returns to computation. It also drastically outper-
forms its obvious contenders: the merging algorithm
and the splitting algorithm. Finally, we showed how to
distribute the desired search across self-interested ma-
nipulative agents.
Our results can also be used as prescriptions for
designing negotiation protocols for coalition structure
generation. The agents should not start with every-
one operating separately—as one would do intuitively.
Instead, they should start from the grand coalition,
and consider different ways of splitting off exactly one
coalition. After that, they should try everyone operat-
ing separately, and continue from there by considering
mergers of two coalitions at a time.
Future research includes studying design-to-time al-
gorithms and on-line search control policies for coalition
structure generation. We are also analyzing the inter-
play of dynamic coalition formation and belief revision
among bounded-rational agents (Tohme´ & Sandholm
1997). The long term goal is to construct normative
methods that reduce the complexity—in the number of
agents and in the size of each coalition’s optimization
problem—for coalition structure generation, optimiza-
tion and payoff division.
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